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Searching for a Coherent National Policy:
The Problem of Foreign Money in
United States Politics
Celeste M. Murphy

*

"I do not think foreign nationals have any business in our political
campaigns. They cannot vote in our elections so why should we allow
them to finance our elections? Their loyalties lie elsewhere; they lie
with their own countries and their own governments."'
"The real scandal in Washington is not what is done illegally, but what

'
is done legally. 2

I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, foreign investors are doing business in the United
States. Corporate firms locate in the United States to avoid protective
tariffs, gain access to the rich U.S. market, acquire technology, and
make a profit? As of 1992, a preliminary survey estimated that
foreign investment in the United States is over $692 billion and
growing.4 To maximize profits and protect these substantial
*

B.A. 1994 New York University; J.D. 1997, State University of New York at

Buffalo School of Law. I owe many thanks to Professor George Kannar for his
constant encouragement and editing advice, without which this study would not have
been possible.
1 120 CONG. REc. 8783 (1974). Senator Bentsen was referring to the investigation
by the Senate Watergate Committee of contributions by foreign nationals. Senator
Bentsen noted a ban for such contributions had recently been called for by President
Nixon.
2

PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE:

How

JAPAN MANIPULATES AMERICA'S

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM I (Touchstone 1991).
3 MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA 261 (Times Books

1988).

4 EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES

18 (Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 1995).

But see, TOLcHIN & TOLCHIN, supranote 3, at 6. See I. Foreign Money, note 2: The

Tolchins estimated in 1987 that foreign direct investment in the United States was
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investments, foreign individuals, governments, and corporations have
studied the U.S. government and electoral process and have expended
significant resources to influence U.S. elections, government officials,
and government agencies. Foreign corporate participation in U.S.
politics has included foreign investors negotiating with state and local
officials when making "siting" decisions for new manufacturing
facilities, and foreign owned United States subsidiaries forming
political action committees (PACs) which lobby and contribute, both
directly and indirectly, to federal, state, and local elections.5
This participation of foreign corporations in the politics of the
United States is a relatively new phenomenon that evolved in the
1980s along with the increase in foreign investment.6 Traditionally,
the United States had approached international trade policies from an
"output" position7 where U.S. corporations had been principally
investing abroad rather than foreign corporations investing in the
United States. This output position has been the standard trade policy
position from which economic policy has been formulated by the
industrial nations and the trade organizations of Organisation of
Economic Development and GATT which represent them. It is the
historical position of the United States in its international trade

$1.5 trillion:The figure of $196 billion was calculated by the Commerce Department
in 1974 and excluded foreign bank deposits abroad. By 1979, the Commerce
Department's calculation had grown to $407 billion, and by 1983, $781.5 billion. Of
that amount, foreign investments in government securities, stocks, and bonds had
jumped from $153.9 billion to $646.1 billion. The figure of $1.5 trillion is the
authors' estimate as of 1987, based on data collected for this study. Readers should
bear in mind the inadequacy of existing data, presently collected by sixteen separate
agencies, and significantly underreported in virtually all major categories.
5 See generally, CHOATE, supra note 2; GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 4;
TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3; THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT,
JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN

STATES (Ernest J. Yanarella et al. eds., Greenwood Press 1990); NORMAN J.
GLICKMAN

&

DOUGLAS P. WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS, How FOREIGN

INVESTORS ARE CHANGING THE U.S. ECONOMY (Basic Books

1989).

6 RACHEL MCCULLOCH, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING

PAPER No. 3672, INVESTMENT POLICIES INTHE

7 Id.

GATT 6 (1991).
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dealings. Until the 1980s, the United States was principally concerned
with U.S. foreign investment abroad Therefore, the primary U.S.
concern, in the interests of investing U.S. companies, was the
relaxation oftrade restrictions by recipient countries. Accompanying
this concern, not surprisingly, was U.S. support of the "national
treatment" principle, or the notion that foreign firms should be treated
as national firms in host countries.
The increased foreign investment in the United States in the
1980s should have forced the U.S. to reevaluate its stance on foreign
investment abroad and at home.9 After all, the U.S. itself has an
interest in minimizing foreign influence in domestic affairs,'" while
maintaining its presence abroad. However, the United States has
failed to acknowledge the need to exercise controls on foreign
investment and its accompanying influence, something long advocated
by international organizations such as the United Nations, its
Commission on International Investment and Transnational
Corporations, and many developing countries." The international
trade and investment goals of the United States should be in conflict
because the United States wishes to secure the benefits of more free
trade and integrated global markets for U.S. business investing
abroad, while retaining complete national sovereignty of home
markets with respect to foreign corporations becoming a larger part
8Id.
9 Id. at 4.
10 See generally, MCCULLOCH, supra note 6.
11 See David Lowry, The National Level Roots of the Failureof State Industrial
Policy, in THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT, JAPANESE AUTFOMOBILE
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES 198 (Ernest
J. Yanarella et al. eds., Greenwood Press 1990). Lowry discusses the failure of the
Reagan Administration to balance the international trade policy that "exerted pressure"
on Japanese firms to locate in the United States, and macroeconomic policy adopted

to reduce inflation, but resulted in high unemployment rates. Lowry states that these
policies led to the desperation of state and local officials to attract foreign firms to their

localities to reduce the high rates of unemployment. The federal government did
nothing to respond to these pressures faced by state officials and the result was that
foreign firms had the higher negotiating position when asking for state "incentive
packages".
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of the United States landscape.
Instead, the resulting United States national industrial policy
has been a default policy"2 where the federal government has done
little or nothing to regulate foreign investment. This void, coupled
with the increase in foreign direct investment in the United States, has
resulted in the formation of individual state industrial policies designed
to lure foreign companies to individual states. These policies were
and continue to be the standard property tax abatements,
infrastructure funding, and state-sponsored training programs for
workers at foreign investment sites. 3 States, in pursuit of their
industrial policies, make large financial concessions to foreign
investors who would likely locate in the United States regardless of
state incentive packages. 4 The industrial policy formulated by the
individual states is ineffective and costly. 5
These new investors form political action committees from
their U.S. subsidiaries which contribute to federal and state elections.
This foreign political participation is in clear violation of U.S. laws
proscribing political participation by foreign entities. However, the
United States has failed to address the increasing political participation
of foreign controlled subsidiaries. This political involvement by
foreign corporations has strengthened the position of foreign investors
in the United States, resulting in the continuing compromise of U.S.
economic and political interests. 6
The United States' inability to respond to the increasing
involvement of foreign corporate participation in the U.S. political
processes allows U.S. political and economic resources to dissipate
while simultaneously leaving U.S. home markets susceptible to foreign
control. This default policy by the United States is inconsistent with
the historical United States policy abroad that has advocated national
treatment standards in an effort to allow U.S. corporations to gain
12 Id. at 197.
13 TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supranote 3, at 49.
14 GLICKMAN & WooDwARD, supra note 5, at 229.

15 Id.

16 GRAHAM

& KRUGMAN, supranote 4, at 85- 86.
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access to global markets. To stabilize U.S. political and corporate
interests, the United States needs to implement a cohesive national
industrial policy that is not one of default, but a policy that balances
the active attraction of foreign direct investment while safeguarding
national political and economic resources.
This paper first evaluates the economic conflicts that illustrate
the need for separate treatment of national and foreign corporations
in the United States. Then, the traditional policy of "national
treatment" advocated by the industrial nations and their representative
trade organizations will be explored. Next, the need for a code of
conduct and national controls on transnational corporations that has
been put forth by the United Nations and the developing countries is
explained. Additionally, the United States domestic regulation and its
limitations are outlined. Finally, solutions advocating a cohesive
federal industrial development policy are put forth.
II. THE ECONOMIC STAKES AND THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS FROM U.S. CORPORATIONS

While foreign corporate participation in government functions
has accounted for only a small amount of overall corporate
participation in the electoral and political functions of the U.S.
government,17 there are a number of reasons why it needs to be
monitored and limited. These reasons include national economic and
security interests"8 that have long been neglected by the default U.S.
industrial policy.
First, strong and active foreign political influence can hinder

17

A NationalJourn*alsurvey in mid- 1986 found that of the 92 PACs sponsored by

corporations, in which a foreign investor held 10 per cent or more of the stock, they
distributed relatively little money. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. (Belgiancontrolled) and Shell Oil Co. (Dutch and British-owned), contributed more than
$100,000 to congressional candidates during the study period. Only $796 was the
average given to congressional candidates by foreign corporations. Bruce Stokes,
ForeignOwners, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Sept. 19, 1987, at 2333, 2335.
18 GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 85-86.
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the government's responsiveness to American corporate concerns and
participation. Successful manipulation by foreign corporations of the
United States' domestic political process channels resources away
from nationals toward foreigners.1 9
In contrast, successful
manipulation of the political process by domestic actors only
redistributes income among nationals."0 The resultant redistribution
of wealth to foreign participants is contrary to national economic,
security and political interests and therefore, should not be furthered
by public policy." This breach of national interest is why foreign
influence in U.S. politics warrants greater concern than influence by
domestic corporations.
Second, national security is compromised by indiscriminate
foreign participation in the U.S. political process. Substantial foreign
ownership of domestic industries may alter the evaluation of economic
policies from a national point of view. 2 Economically, this effects a
wider-scale redistribution of wealth than foreign participation, as
discussed above, because large scale politics and funding of election
campaigns have the tendency to increase foreign direct investment,
thereby shaping national policies by economic considerations.3
Factoring foreign demands into the equation of national policy has a
costly effect to the nation. For example, the review process for
foreign investment in the United States is already ineffective.
However, increasing political control and expansive economic
investment by foreign investors relaxes the review process for the
acquisition of key defense, chemical engineering and aeronautic
industries in the United States. Policymakers, eager for continued and
increasing foreign investment, are slow to review or prohibit
acquisitions that may be a threat to national security.
Another national security conflict is due to the fact that
disclosure of the identity of firm ownership and control is rarely
19 GRAHAM
20 Id.
21

Id.

2 Id. at 85.
2 Id. at 86.

& KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 86.
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mandated, and even then disclosure mandates are avoided. The
majority of foreign political influence is rarely identified as what it is:
foreign participation in U.S. politics, voicing foreign goals and
loyalties. For example, the privatization of defense-related sectors is
economically beneficial to both the government and the private sector
because the industry becomes more efficient.24 However, when
foreign-controlled firms compete for the newly-privatized defense
industry, U.S. national security interests are compromised. 5 This
foreign presence is even more problematic when there is no disclosure
of the identity of the acquiring corporation because deficient review
processes are further weakened by insufficient information.
Finally, while the United States doles out its own economic,
political and natural resources to foreigners who compete with U.S.
corporations, there is little to no reciprocity in benefits or incentives
for U.S. corporations that invest abroad.26 This lack of reciprocity is
costly to American corporations competing in a global market where
foreign corporations are not only receiving their home country's
economic and political concessions, but those of the United States, as
well. As a result, American business cannot effectively compete.
First, they are not as successful abroad due to tight foreign control on
entry plans and lack of economic incentives to invest in foreign
countries. Additionally, American business is not effective at home
because they must "share" economic and political resources in their
home market. The combined effect of lack of profitability abroad and
loss of profitability in the United States results in investment loss, low
profit margins and the inevitable "downsizing" of American
industries.2
24
25

Id. at 86.
Id. at 86. Graham & Krugman discuss this as a relevant issue in the Clinton

administration.
26See id. at 156-158, Graham & Krugman acknowledge that lack of reciprocity does
exist for U.S. corporations investing abroad. However, the authors caution that the
U.S. should retaliate with a similar policy by limiting foreign investors own "equal
treatment" with U.S. corporations in the U.S. Graham & Krugman urge that a more
liberalized trade policy should be adopted worldwide.
27 See generally, TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3.
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NATIONAL SECURITY: NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The United States as the leading advocate of the national
treatmentprinciple
The United States has long been a stalwart proponent of the
policy of national treatment.28 The principle of national treatment
mandates equal application of the laws of a host country to the
foreign-controlled corporation operating within the host's jurisdiction.
This treatment includes the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers
worldwide so as to secure more globally integrated markets that
assure access for U.S. corporations doing business abroad. The
international trading community has traditionally been divided into
two camps. Developing nations have consistently resisted efforts to
apply a national treatment standard, arguing that they will lose
autonomy in economic development decisions if they are not able to
place restrictions and requirements on transnational corporations
operating within their countries. In contrast, business interests and
industrialized nations have repeatedly called for norms for provisions
that would encourage fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory treatment
of transnational corporations.'
Recently, Congressional testimony on the World Trade
Organization before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade stipulated
that the two cornerstone rules of the World Trade Organization, the
Most Favored Nation principle and National Treatment, are in fact

28 See, e.g., Susan B. Hansen, IndustrialPolicies in the American States: Historical

and Comparative Perspectives, in THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT 3
(Ernest Yanarella et al. eds., 1990). Hansen explains that "even before the American
Revolution the colonies were heavily involved in efforts to encourage investment and
to promote business."
29

KAWAMENA ACQUAAH, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL

CORPORATIONS, THE NEW REALITY 117 (1986).
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basic tenets of the American political and economic systems.3"
Political economist Joe Cobb stated, "National treatment is a principle
that is very central to the American political and economic system,
inasmuch as it is written into our Constitution. Article IV, Section 2,
says: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the Several States."3 Cobb noted that
"without the early adoption of free trade and national treatment
among all of our states, this country could never have developed
economically to become the wealthiest nation on earth."32
Mr. Cobb is not alone in advocating for the international
adoption of "national treatment." President Clinton most recently
stated his support for the principle of national treatment in a letter to
the Senate on the Bilateral Investment Treaty with Uzbekistan.
President Clinton confirmed, "The Treaty is fully consistent with U.S.
policy toward international and domestic investment. A specific tenet
of U.S. policy, reflected in this Treaty, is that U.S. investment abroad
and foreign investment in the United States should receive national
treatment. 33
Congress has enunciated the United States' policy of the

30 The World Trade Oganization:Congressional Testimony Before the Comm. on

Ways andMeansSubcomn. on Trade, 1996 WL 7136856 (1996) (statement of Joe
Cobb, John M. Olin Senior Fellow in Political Economy).
31
32

Id. at 6-7.

Id. at 7. Mr. Cobb continued:

Critics of the World Trade Organization and of trade agreements in general may well
say that they do not want foreign business people and foreign products to be treated
in the United States the same as products produced here or businesses owned by
Americans, but the question then has to be, "Do we want Americans to be
discriminated against by foreign governments when they try to do business or sell
products to other countries?"
The World Trade Organization provides a framework to go and try to get equal
treatment for Americans. But the concept of playing fair and following equal rules
naturally implies that Americans will also play by the same rules.
33 Letterfron PresidentClinton to the Senate on BilateralInvestment Treaty with
Uzbekistan, U.S. Newswire, Feb. 28, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 5619791 at 3.
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freedom and promotion of foreign investment stating:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign direct investment are--

(A)(i) to reduce or to eliminate artificial or tradedistorting barriers to foreign direct investment, to
expand the principle of national treatment, and to
reduce unreasonable barriers to establishment; and
(ii) to develop internationally agreed rules, including
dispute settlement procedures, which-(I) will help ensure a free flow of foreign direct
investment, and
(II) will reduce or eliminate the trade distortive effects
of certain trade-related investment measures.
(B) In pursuing the negotiating objectives described
in subparagraph (A), United States negotiators shall
take into account legitimate United States domestic
objectives including, but not limited to, the protection
of legitimate health or safety, essential security,
environmental, consumer or employment opportunity
interests and the law and regulations related thereto.34
The United States continues to liberalize the meaning and
application of national treatment. Most recently, on February 8, 1996,
President Clinton signed the new telecommunications law into effect
which "includes unrestricted market access and national treatment for
foreign companies in the US 'local' telecommunications market."35
The telecommunications law deregulates the U.S. telecommunications
industry by eliminating internal barriers between local markets, cable
34

19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1 1) (1988).

35 Jeffrey Lang, U.S. deputy trade representative, communiquW, Feb. 26, 1996,

reprinted in US offers "unrestrictedmarket access" to foreign telecom firms,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3811558 at 1.
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and telephone.3 6 U.S. deputy trade representative, Jeffrey Lang, has
presented the "offer" of "unrestricted national treatment" to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), conditioned on the opening of
competition rules in the markets of a "critical mass" of WTO
members.37 The term "national treatment" in the telecommunications
law means that the U.S. will grant foreign telecommunications
companies the same treatment as it gives to its own national
companies. However, it has been determined that Lang's offer before
the WTO is meant to be revoked if the "critical mass" of countries do
not agree to provide market access and national treatment in the
telecommunications sector.38 The WTO members that have not
opened their telecommunications markets to foreign companies
include the European Union (EU), Japan and several other Asian
countries, Australia, New Zealand, and such countries as Brazil and
Argentina.39 Lang urged the other countries "to make similar
improvements to their offers, or for countries that have not tabled
40
offers to do so now..
The economic interests of the corporations of industrial
countries, such as the United States, have been represented by the
trade organizations these countries have built. These interests were
first represented by the formation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) constructed after World War II. The General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is the successor to the WTO and has
functioned as the main vehicle for the elimination of trade and tariff
barriers world-wide. The promulgation of national treatment by such
trade organizations has been an effective force in guaranteeing access
to global markets for transnational corporations.41

36

Id.

37 Id. at 2.
38

Id. at 3 (referring to the interpretation by "an informed source in Geneva.").

39 I.
40

41 See generally, MCCULLOCH, supra note 6.

552

BUFFALO JOURAAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 3

B. InternationalEndorsementsof the National Treatment Principle
1. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is one of the leading trade organizations encouraging
implementation of the national treatment principle. The most recent
project ofthe OECD has been the production of a strengthened 1993
National Treatment Instrument.42 This National Treatment Instrument
is one of four sections of the 1976 Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises. The National Treatment
Section is the Third Revised Decision on National Treatment,
adopted by the OECD Council in December 199 L" The OECD, in
the foreword of the 1993 report states:
OECD Member countries have declared that
enterprises operating in their territory and controlled
by nationals of another Member country should be
treated no less favourably than domestic enterprises in
like situations, that is they should be accorded
"National Treatment".
Member countries have
gradually taken steps to extend their application of this
principle by removing restrictions on foreign direct
investment, thus contributing to a much improved
investment climate."

42

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL

TRATmENT FOR FOREIGN CoNTRoLLED ENTERPRIsES (1993) [hereinafter

OECD]. The

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has issued a 1993 report
on national treatment. In the foreword, the OECD states the purpose: to provide
Member governments and the general public with a comprehensive and accessible
explanation of the principle of National Treatment and how it is applied among OECD
countries. It is designed to improve implementation of the National Treatment
principle through a better understanding of its nature and scope." Id. at 3.
Id. at 13.
"Id. at3.
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The National Treatment Instrument, originally meant to be a
legally binding document, is now reinforced by new mandatory
reporting measures and "increased peer pressure on Member countries
The
to reduce the number and scope of their restrictions." '
Declaration defines national treatment and the meaning of
treatment and
liberalisation, lists acceptable exceptions to 4national
6
discusses the principle of non-discrimination.
2. GATT
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the leading
world trade organization, has advocated "free trade" since the end of
World War II." Free trade necessitates the application of the
"national treatment" principle for host countries where foreign
corporations operate. National treatment insures that restrictions on
the free flow of goods, services, and capital throughout the world are
reduced.48 In the Uruguay negotiations on "Trade Related Investment
Measures" (TRIMs), the GATT specifically addressed the "national
TRIMs deemed
treatment" of foreign investors abroad.49
and
requirements
included
local-content
unacceptable by the GATT
minimum-export requirements which would force foreign investors to
"source" a certain percentage of their manufacturing materials in the
home country where they manufacture, and export a certain amount
of their finished good, so as not to flood local markets.5" The
Uruguay round on TRIMs was a notable first in the GATT history
because the GATT was designed to address issues of trade. In
contrast, foreign investment is a capital investment and goods are
being reduced from within the country, rather than being exported to

45
1d. at
46

10.

1d. at 14-17.

47 TOLCHIN

48

Id. at 4.

& TOLCHIN, supranote 3, at 4-5.

49 MCCULLOCH,

SOId. at 1.

supra note 6, at 1.
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that country."1 The Uruguay round viewed TRIMs as a trade policy
problem that inhibits international free trade and should be phased out
through "grandfather clauses" with newly imposed TRIMs
prohibited. 2 The application of the national treatment principle would
not allow for foreign corporations investing in host countries to be
subject to such performance requirements as TRIMs. It is this result
that the GATT hopes to achieve.
The United States and the several international trade
organizations have continuously advocated world-wide acceptance of
the principle of national treatment without including mention of how
national treatment should function with regard to political
participation in the host country. However, there has been
international recognition that transnational corporations need to
adhere to a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of another country
where it operates. The international norms of non-intervention, as
applied to states and transnational corporations are well established
principles of customary international law. 3
C.

InternationalNorms ofNon-Intervention

International organizations and the developing nations they
represent have long been opposed to the blind adoption of the national
treatment principle. Acceptance of national treatment by developing
nations has long been viewed as a relinquishment of national

51 See id,at 6. McCulloch argues that a separate GATT for foreign direct investment
may be a better way to address the very different issue of foreign direct investment.
McCulloch states that because of the differences between trade and investment, a more
effective governing of investment issues would be a separate GATT for foreign direct
investment that "would establish a set of rules and dispute-settlement procedures
aimed at increasing the global benefits of international investment, just as GATT doesat least in principle--for national policies governing trade."
52 Id. at 12.
53 Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch examines various international
instruments that
articulate and support "the nonintervention norm as a textual principle." Lori Fisler
Damrosch, PoliticsAcross Border: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 6 (1989).
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sovereignty and the ability to effectively evaluate and implement the
most useful economic development program for such developing
nations.
These developing nations and their representative
international organizations have called for limits on the forms and
strengths of transnational influence in their countries' economic,
political and security interests. These interests of developing nations
can be supported by the international customary norm of nonintervention among foreign nations.
1. The United Nations Charter
The norm of non-intervention in the affairs of states is a wellestablished customary international norm. This international norm of
non-intervention is exhibited in several international documents54 and
resolutions. The Charter of the United Nations refers to the "right to
self determination" throughout. 55 The Charter states "to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." '56 The Charter
also recognizes the right to political independence. 57 Moreover, the
United Nations recognizes its own inability to intervene in the national
affairs of Member States: "nothing contained in the present Charter

Documents not examined in this paper which recognized the principle of nonintervention include the 1970 Declaration on Principles of InternationalLaw
concerningFiendlyRelations and Co-operationamong States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970) and the
Declarationon the Establishmentof a New InternationalEconomic Order,G.A. Res.
2131 QO) (1965). See also The Declarationon the Admissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, GA Res. 2225 (XXI) (1966).
55 U.N. CHARTER passim.
56 Id. at art. 1, para. 2.
57 U.N. CHARTER art.2, para. 4. "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." Id.
54
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shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter." 8
Subsequent documents also refer to the right to "selfdetermination". Both the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights state "All people have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."' 9
Indeed, these instruments, and the right to political freedom that they
embody constitute basic international human rights law.'
2. General Assembly Resolutions
General Assembly resolutions have reiterated the United
Nations' commitment to non-intervention. The Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Declaration on
Intervention)61 was drafted and enacted due to the international alarm
at "direct or indirect forms of interference threatening the sovereign
'
personality and political independence of States."62
The document
declares that "no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State."' The Declaration on Intervention recognizes the principle of

58 Id. art. 2, para. 7.
59 UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANTON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
art.

1, U.N. Doe. A/63 16 (1966); UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTuRAL RIGHTS, art. 1, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
60 See generallyFRANK NEwMAN AND DAVID WEISBRODT, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (1990).

61 G.A. Res. 213 1, supranote 54, at 11; see also G.A. Res. 2225, supra note 54, at
16.
62 G.A. Res. 213 1, supranote 54, at 11.
63 Id. at 12.
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non-intervention" and prohibits States from using or encouraging the
"use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce
another State to secure advantages of any kind.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States"
reiterates the principle of non-intervention by stating that political
relations among States are governed by the principle of "Sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of States." 67 This
declaration prescribes the economic rights and duties of States. These
duties include the freedom to "choose its political system without
outside interference, coercion or threat."6 1 Significantly, this Charter
acknowledges the right of states to "regulate and supervise the
activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction
and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws,
rules and regulations and conform with its economic and social
policies."'69 This Charter declares that "Transnational corporations
70
shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State."
The recognition that multinational enterprises "now play an
important part in the economies"' of the governments of the world
has led international organizations to draft communiques regulating
the behavior of transnational corporations. The Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises adopted by the OECD in 1976,72
acknowledges that "the advances made by multinational enterprises in
organising their operations beyond the national framework may lead
to abuse of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts with

The Declaration on Intervention states that deprivation of national identity
"constitutes a violation of the inalienable rights and of the principle of non-

64

intervention". Id.
65

Id.

GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) at 50 (1974).
Id. at 51.
68 Id. at 52.
69 id.
6

67

70

id.

71 O.E.C.D. Press Release (June 22, 1976), reprintedin 15 ILM 969.
72

id.
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national policy objectives."' The guidelines propose vague standards
by which corporations should abide. They provide that enterprises
"should,... (8) unless legally permissible, not make contributions to
candidates for public office or to political parties or other political
organizations; (9) abstain from any improper involvement in local
political activities." 74
3. The United Nations Commission on International Investment and
Transnational Corporations (Formerly the Commission on
Transnational Corporations)
The most significant international body to focus specifically on
the norms of conduct for transnational corporations is the United
Nations Commission on International Investment and Transnational
Corporations."' Work on the formulation of the United Nations Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations76 is conducted by the
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC). The
United Nations Commission on International Investment and

73 id.
74
Id. at 972.
7 The Commission recently changed its name from the United Nations Commission
on Transnational Corporations to the United Nations Commission on International
Investment and Transnational Corporations. See Robert J. Fowler, International
EnvironmentalStandardsfor TransnationalCorporation,25 ENVL. L. 1,30 n. 139.
76 UN Doc. E/C. 10/1 985/S/2, at 24-26. The text of the draft code is divided into
six
parts. The first part is reserved for the preamble and statement of objectives (yet to
be agreed upon). Definitions and the scope of application of the code are in the
second part. The third part is divided into four sections and will discuss activities of
TNCs, first with general political implications, second with specific economic,
financial, and social issues; and the third section will address disclosure of information
by TNCs. The kind of treatment TNCs could expect from host governments is
addressed by the fourth part. Intergovernmental cooperation for the application of the
code is covered by the fifth part. Finally, the sixth part will concern modalities for
implementation of the development at national and international levels. KWAMENA
ACQUAAH, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE

NEwREALiTY 114 (1986).
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Transnational Corporations was established in 1974. 77 The
Commission is an inter-governmental subsidiary body of one of the
major organs of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). 78 The Commission elects sixteen expert advisers, or
"Group of Eminent Persons" to assist the Commission in its
deliberations. The main functions of the Commission are to "discuss
and keep under review all issues related to Transnational Corporations
(TNCs), to draft the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations and to advise ECOSOC in all matters relating to
TNCs"

79

Furthermore, the Commission determines the priorities and

the program work of the Centre on Transnational Corporations.8" It
is clear that the focus of the Commission has been to strengthen the
bargaining power of third world countries in their negotiations with
transnational corporations by providing them with information.8 '
The Commission has recognized the importance of
international efforts to prohibit involvement of transnational
corporations in host country politics.8 2 It stated, "concern over the
impact of transnational corporations in domestic and international
affairs of States has been expressed in a variety of forums and texts
and several efforts to prescribe the conduct of transnational
corporations in other fields have been made in documents of various

77 UNTED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, UNITED NATIONS,

UNCTC BIBLIOGRAPHY 1974-1987, at I(1988).
78 id.
79 id

80 Id.
81 ACQUAAH, supra note 29, at I11.

The Commission has considered "Political Issues" to be one of the "most important
substantive issues" in formulating a code of conduct. The Commission cited the
Economic Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Governments of
Non-Aligned Countries: "The Heads of State or Government denounce before the
world public opinion the unacceptable practices of transnational companies which
infringe the sovereignty of developing countries and violate the principles of noninterference and the right of peoples to self-determination which are basic prerequisites for their political, economic and social progress." See CENTRE ON
82

TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: MATERIAL
RELEVANT TO THE FORMULATION OF A CODE OF CONDUCT 21-22 (1976).
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origins.",3
However, meetings of the Commission have not yet resulted
in any codification of regulations. A draft code of conduct for
transnational corporations has been in preparation for many years.84
One of the issues in continuing dispute is how the draft code should
deal with corporate political activities, in view of widely diverse
attitudes and practices in different parts of the world. The
Commission stated "While the principle of prohibition of political
intervention in domestic affairs of States is beyond dispute, the lines
of admissible political involvement have not yet been generally
85
drawn."
Regarding political contributions by transnational
corporations, the Group of Eminent Persons, in advising the
Commission, stated, "The financial contributions of multinational
corporations as well as of others to interest groups, should be
regulated and disclosed." 6 The Commission reviewed the Group of
Eminent Persons' recommendations:
The Group felt that as a general principle the public
activities of these corporations should be confined to
those having a direct relationship to the objectives set
out for the corporation upon its entry into the host
country; for example representing their views to local
authorities regarding policies that might affect their
own companies.
Thus, the Group implicitly
acknowledged the conflict inherent in an affiliate of a
transnational corporation to be at the same time a

83

Id.

The Commission on International Investment and Transnational Corporations first
met in New York in 1975. At the time international criticism for transnational
corporate activities throughout the world was at its all time high. JOHN ROBINSON,
MULTINATIONALS AND POLITICAL CONTROL 165 (1983).
85 MATERIALS RELEVANT TO THE FORMULATION OF A CODE OF CONDUCT, supranote
82, at 21.
86 Id. at 23.
84
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"good citizen" and a "discreet foreigner". As a "good
citizen" it has the right to express views concerning
governmental policies; as a "discreet foreigner" it
should do it in a circumspect way. Then the onus falls
on the Government to delineate permissible political
activities. Publicity in this area was favoured."
The Commission recognizes that political interference "can
assume a variety of forms, some less obvious than others."88 The
Commission stated the need for a provision in the Code of Conduct
that would require "transnational corporations to abstain from all
interference in the internal affairs of the country in which they operate,
or prohibiting improper political activities."89 The Commission stated
that this provision would cover the various forms of political pressure
exerted by transnational corporations and would include "illegal
contributions to political parties, political organizations or candidates
for public office."9
Clearly there are problems with the acceptance of an
international code of conduct for international investment and
transnational corporations. Developing nations hope for a legally
binding, enforceable document in the form of a multilateral treaty
while transnational corporations urge that document by a voluntary
code.9 ' It is unclear when or if the commission will be able to
formulate and implement a code that will meet the requirements of its
many member states.
However, the Commission has taken
considerable steps in creating an international forum for the different
concerns of the governments and corporations involved. However,
the Commission has taken considerable steps in creating an
international forum for the different concerns of the governments and
corporations involved.
87

Id.

88 CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note
89 id.
90 Id.
91 AcQuAH, supra note 29, 115.

82, at 22.
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Recognition of the norm of nonintervention is not unique to
developing nations and in fact, some of the most economically
successful nations have developed and adopted some of the most
restrictive laws regarding foreign corporate influence of their
countries' national politics and economies.' These nations typically
continue to invest abroad, gaining access to international markets
while maintaining national controls over their home markets through
effective legislation prohibiting undue foreign corporate influence and
implementing cohesive national economic industrial policies.
IV. COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES OF OTHER NATIONS' POLICIES
REGARDING THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN INVESTORS

Several nations exercise sovereign control over their countries'
economic and political resources.93 This control necessarily results in
the limitation of access to these valuable assets. It is the recognition
of the importance of these resources and the need to limit access to
them that result in strong economic markets that attract foreign direct
investment in the first place. Foreign investment and national exercise
and control of sovereignty have been successfully balanced by several
countries.9"
Foreign legislation regarding foreign direct investment includes
a variety of measures designed to limit the political participation of
foreign investors in the host countries where they locate. Many of
these laws screen foreign direct investment," while implementing
review, acceptance or rejection mechanisms ban foreign electoral
involvement,96 and articulate cohesive national policies of economic
development.97 Professor Lori Damrosch has written about the

92 See generally Damrosch, supranote 53.
9 Id. at 25.
94 Id. at 24.
95 TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 223.
96 Damroseh, supranote 53, at 25.
97 See GRAHAiaM & KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 145; TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note

3, at 223; GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 25 1.
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several types of treatment of foreign participation in national politics.
There is a wide spectrum of prohibition and acceptance of foreign
campaign contributions. While there appears to be no norm in the
way countries prohibit foreign political participation, Professor
Damrosch has concluded that the fact "that a variety of countries have
recently adopted or strengthened measures against foreign funding is
at least some evidence of a trend toward delegitimizing this activity."98
Countries restrict the influence of foreign investment for a
number of reasons. As Professors Tolchin & Tolchin have stated: "in
all cases restrictions on foreign investment reflect a country's
insecurity; they protect a local industry from competition and, in a
broader sense, allow that country to retain a sense of control over its
economy."" For example, Canada, in 1985, issued new regulations
restricting foreign investment. These regulations were enforced
immediately, the first instance being the Prentice-Hall acquisition"00 by
Gulf & Western. The effect of the new legislation was that Gulf &
Western had to divest itself of the Canadian subsidiary within two
years. The justification given for the decision to regulate the book10 1
publishing industry was Canadas "fear of U.S. cultural dominance.'
Foreign legislation that bans electoral participation by foreign
investors is widespread. 2 For example, in France, legislation
prohibits candidates for election to Parliament from receiving
"contributions or material assistance from a foreign state or from a
natural or juridical person of foreign nationality.'" 03 Taiwan (Republic

98

Damrosch, supra note 53, at 28.

supra note 3, at 226.
100 At the time of the enacted legislation, $23 million in annual sales was reported by
99 TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN,

Prentice-Hall. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 226.

'o1 Id.

102 For a discussion of Canadian provincial laws prohibiting foreign campaign

donations, see Khayyam Z. Paltiel, Campaign Finance,DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS
161 (David Butler et al. eds. 1981).
103 Loi organique no. 88-226 relative a Ia transparence financiere de la vie politique,
Mar. 11, 1988, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 3288, Art. 8 (Mar. 12,
1988), citedin Danrosch, supra note 53 , at 25, note 103. (This law added Art. L.O.
163-4 to the French electoral codes).
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of China) prohibits foreign participation in elections by mandating that
"Candidates shall not accept campaign contributions from the
following sources: (1) Foreign groups, juridical persons or
individuals." 04 Similarly, the Chilean Constitution states that political
10°5
parties "may not have income of foreign origin."
Other electoral codes are more exhaustive. For example, the
Philippine Election Code of 1978 states:
Intervention of foreigners
It shall be unlawful for any foreigner, whether juridical
or natural person, to aid any candidate or political
party, group or aggrupation [sic] directly or indirectly,
or to take part in or influence in any manner any
election, or to contribute or make any expenditure in
connection with any election campaign or partisan
political activity.' 6
While these examples of electoral laws prohibiting foreign
electoral participation are not meant to be complete, they do provide
illustrations of the growing trend toward restrictive policies governing
foreign electoral participants.
Countries also limit the political influence of foreign investors
through cohesive national policies that significantly limit state and
locality incentive programs. These programs are tied to performance

104

Public Officials Election and Recall Law, May 14, 1980, amended July 7, 1983,

Art. 45-2(1). See generally HumAN RIGHTS INTAIWAN 1986-87: AN ASIA WATCH
REPORT, at 197-239 (December 1987).
105 CHILE CONST. Art. 19(15), in 4 CONSTrITUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 199 1). See Ley organica constitutional de los partidos
0oliticos, Law No, 18.603, Mar. 23, 1987, Art. 33.
Pres. Decree No. 1296, §36, cited in R. MARTIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW 382 (1983). Section 65 of the same decree
provides: "No contribution shall be made directly or indirectly by any of the
following:...(g) Foreigners and foreign corporations." See Damrosch, supra note 53,
at 25.
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requirements 10 7 reinforced with clawback provisions."0 8 While
performance requirements have been viewed as controversial by some
scholars, 1" they have been viewed as an essential part of foreign direct
investment policy by others.110 Examples of extensive and successful
uses of performance requirements are found through out the world.
Professors Glickman and Woodward state:
Overseas, the most common requirements are various
domestic content provisions: an MNC (Multi National
Corporation) must produce a specified level of its sales
Other requirements include manpower
locally.
performance (job creation and limits on foreign
employees), minimum export levels, maximum import
limits, encouragement of investment in priority
industries and development areas, limitations on
acquisitions of domestic firms, technology transfer
agreements, and restrictions on remittances of profit.
107

Performance requirements are frequently used by European countries. These

requirements, tied to incentive packages offered to foreign investors, include
contractual obligations that a certain number of jobs will be created, that a certain
percentage of inputs will be bought locally, and may include other community building
projects. Glickman & Woodward give the example that "a high-tech firm could be
asked to help put together a science curriculum for the high schools or junior college."
These performance requirements tied to incentive packages often create a more equal
relationship between companies and the communities where they locate. GLICMAN
& WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 251-52.
108
Clawback provisions come into effect when a company does not meet the
performance requirements it agreed to in the original investment contract. These
clawbacks work as penalties to acquire what the community lost in incentives when
the company did not meet its obligations. Id. at 252.
109 Tolchin & Tolchin state that performance standards, which include local content
requirements, local worker requirements and the like, are considered to be a distortion
of free trade and investment by U.S. policymakers. The professors state that "All
performance standards lead to one goal: reducing competition for local manufacturers.
They are regarded as an uneconomical use of resources and detrimental to everyone."
TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 227.
110 See GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 251; Graham & Krugman, supra

note 4, at 145.
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Among developed nations, Canada has had the most
active foreign investment policy for the simple reason
that more of its economy is controlled by overseas
MNCs than any other. In this respect, it is way ahead
of the United States."'
Authors Graham and Krugman state that foreign governments
differ significantly from the U.S. government in their "greater
willingness to trade incentives for performance requirements."" 2 This
willingness reflects the fact that foreign governments have proven to
be more amenable to targeted industrial policy in general.' Graham
and Krugman state:
the policies of the advanced nations do differ markedly
in ...
[the] provision of investment incentives and
performance requirements.
Incentives tied to
performance requirements are in general offered more
freely in other nations than in the United States. For
example, the United Kingdom, which is among the
most open nations with respect to FDI [foreign direct
investment], has not been averse to combining
investment incentives with performance requirements.
A case in point is a large investment by Nissan Motor
Company in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s, in
which the quid pro quo for certain investment
incentives, among them outright subsidies, included
The authors provide the following example of recent U.S. steps to enforce
incentive agreements, "When Chicago gave Playskool a set of incentives, and the
company promised to provide some jobs, Playskool closed without carrying out its end
of the agreement; and Duluth, Minnesota took Triangle Industries to court on similar
grounds." Glickman and Woodward state that these cases set important precedents
in U.S. courts for the principle of seeking redress. Additionally, this is why clawback
agreements should be stipulated to prior to costly court proceedings. GLICKMAN &
WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 252-253.
112 GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 146.

113Id.
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both a local-content target and a commitment to
Incentives and
export to continental Europe.
performance requirements are used by other European
nations as well." 4
The performance requirements tied to limited incentive
programs are viewed by most to be a way in which corporations and
the communities where they build facilities can create a more equal
relationship. 15
Exercising sovereign control over political and economic
interests does not necessarily exclude a country's ability to attract
foreign investment and development. In fact, the appropriate
symmetry is often beneficial to the national economies and the foreign
investors in foreign direct investment. However, it is important that
the need to protect certain resources are recognized while not
dissuading foreign corporate investment.
V. U.S. LEGISLATION PROSCRIBING POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN

U.S. ELECTIONS BY FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ITS INEFFECTIVENESS

The United States, like many other countries, has domestic
legislation that is meant to prohibit certain foreign participation in
state and federal political elections. Policies such as this are common,
as demonstrated by the international practice of limiting foreign
corporate political participation by transnational corporations.
However, as demonstrated by the economic success" 6 of these
countries, foreign direct investment is not necessarily hampered by
sovereign control mechanisms over political and economic resources.

114 Id. at 145-46.
115
116

GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supranote 4, at 252.
Germany and Japan are two examples of countries with the most restrictive foreign

investment policies. See generallyTOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3.
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A. FederalElection Campaigns Disclosure of Federal Campaign
1 17

Funds

The Federal Election Campaign Disclosure of Federal
Campaign Funds Act prohibits "contributions of money or other thing
of value, or to promise expressly'or impliedly to make any such
contribution""' 8 when it is done in connection with an election "to any
political office or in connection with any primary election, convention
or caucus held to select candidates for any political office; or for any
person to solicit, accept, or receive any such contribution from a
foreign national."" 9 The Disclosure Act adopts the definition of
"foreign principal", as set forth in the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, 2 ' to mean "foreign national" within the scope of the Federal
Election Campaign Act.' Therefore, a "foreign national" is:
(1) a government of a foreign country and a foreign
political party;
(2) a person outside of the United States, unless it is
established that such person is not an individualand
is organized under or created by the laws of the
UnitedStates, or that such person is not an individual
and is organized under or created by the laws of the
UnitedStates or of any State or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and has its
principalplace of business within the UnitedStates;
and
2 U.S.C. § 441e, II C.F.R. §110.4(a).
Federal Election Campaigns Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds, 2 U.S.C.
§441 e(a).[hereinafter "the Disclosure Act"].
19 Id.
120 22 U.S.C. §§611-621 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75583, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §61 l)[hereinafter FARA]
(1938).
121 The term "foreign national" means "a foreign principal, as such term is defined
by
section I (b)of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 (b))".
The Disclosure Act, supra note 20, at (b)(1).
117
118
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(3) a partnership, association,
corporation,
organization, or other combination of persons
organized under the laws or having a principal place of
business in a foreign country. 1
The Federal Election Commission has interpreted "foreign
principal", as set forth in section 2 of the FARA's definition. And
"foreign national", as adopted by the Federal Election Campaign Act,
as allowing wholly-foreign owned United States subsidiaries to form
Political Action Committees (hereinafter "PACs") and participate in
United States elections. The issues involved in allowing PACs of
wholly foreign-owned U.S. subsidiaries are discussed in detail in the
following section of this paper.
Additionally, according to the Federal Election Campaign Act,
a foreign national shall not "direct, dictate, control, or directly or
indirectly participate in the decision making process of any person,
such as a corporation, labor organization, or political committee, with
regard to such person's Federal or nonfederal election-related
activities."'" These decisions concern the making of contributions or
expenditures in connection with elections for any local, state, or
federal office or decisions concerning the administration of a political
committee. 124
The United States regulations on foreign participation in U.S.
political processes is a necessary and important part of the economic
policy of the United States. These sovereign controls, exercised in the
national legislation, safeguard national economic and political interests
within the United States. However, with the recent influx of foreign
investment and subsequent foreign participation in the United States
electoral process, the strength and efficacy of the U.S. regulations and
restrictions on foreign political participation are challenged and
strained. U.S. legislation prohibiting foreign influence in the United
States has failed to meet the challenge of the political and economic
122
123
124

Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §611 (emphasis added).
Federal Election Commission-Prohibited Contributions, 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(a)(3).
Id.
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pressures that the 1980s increase in foreign direct investment in the
United States has brought. Foreign corporations have profited from
the inability of U.S. controls to safeguard economic and political
resources, by enjoying widespread and powerful political
representation and resulting economic benefits.
B. Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinions: ForeignControlled Corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) and
campaigncontributions
According to a line of Federal Election Committee Advisory
Opinions," foreign-owned United States subsidiary corporations are
allowed to participate in federal, state and local elections through the
formation of political action committees. 26 In several divided
opinions the FEC has interpreted the federal laws to allow foreign
owned companies to create and operate PACs, contributing to both
the federal and state officials of the United States. Generally, the FEC
advisory opinions have ruled that an American subsidiary corporation
of a foreign corporation can establish and administer a PAC as long
as: (1) the American subsidiary corporation has its principal place of
business in the United States and (2) the PAC's fund-raising and
decision-making processes are managed by U.S. citizens. However,
the FEC has repeatedly asked Congress for clarification on this
issue. 127
The lead dissenter in the FEC cases involving foreign owned
125

See FEC Advisory Opinions: AO 1977-53; AO 1978-21; AO 1980-100; AO

1980-111;AO 1981-36;AO 1981-51;AO 1982-10;AO 1982-34; and AO 1983-19.
Foreign controlled PACs operate in the same way the PACs of American

126

corporations do. As long as only U.S. citizens donate to the committees and make
their decisions, foreign-controlled companies may establish such organizations. All
PACs are allowed to contribute $25,000 per election. Only American company
employees make up foreign company-sponsored PACs, officially. However, company
management, in reality, runs all corporate PACs, foreign and domestic. It has been
widely believed that company managers do nothing but toe the company line.
GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS, supranote 5, at 273.
127

See FEC Agenda Doc. No. 87-22, concerning 1987 legislative recommendations.

1996-97] FOREIGNMONEYIN UITED STATES POLITICS 571
companies' PACs has been former Commissioner Thomas E. Harris.
Harris argues that allowing PACs of foreign-controlled companies
allows foreign participation in Federal Elections, frustrating the
purpose of the 1974 Federal Elections Campaign Act:
The PAC is always controlled by the top management
of the corporation. By permitting foreign nationals to
incorporate in the U.S. and thereby avoid the
prohibitions of Section 441(e) [which bars foreign
contributions to U.S. political campaigns], the
commission does a great disservice to the
congressional intention to keep foreign influence out
of federal elections in the U.S. The notion that no
decisions as to the activities of the proposed political
committee will be dictated or directed by foreign
nationals strikes me as extremely naive.128
Senator Bentsen agreed with Commissioner Harris, stating: "Ifyou
have a PAC from a subsidiary of a foreign company, it certainly seems
to me that you open the door to foreign influence in our elections. My
amendment closed that door. The foreign company will obviously
dictate to the subsidiary on how its PAC will be used."'2 9
One clear example of the foreign corporate influence on their
PACs referred to by Commissioner Harris and Senator Bentsen is
illustrated in the 1982 fundraiser held for Robin Beard, a Republican
candidate campaigning for the seat of U.S. Senator Jim Sasser, a
Democrat. The fundraiser was given by American executives of the
Nissan Motor Company. It was apparent that the fundraiser was
given in retaliation for Mr. Sasser's support of the domestic content
bill. Mr. Beard supported the bill that would require a certain
percentage of heavy industrial products sold in the United States to be
128

Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion No. 1980-100, reprintedin I

Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5548 (Oct. 14, 1980), dissentingopinion
of Commissioner Thomas E. Harris.
129 TOLCHIN & ToLCHIN,supranote 3, at 19.
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manufactured in the United States. 130
In 1989, the Federal Election Commission ruled that a political
action committee, dependent on financial support from a Japanese
corporation, could not contribute to state and local elections in Hawaii
and remain in compliance with the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971.131 Kuilima, a subsidiary of Asahi USA, a wholly Japanese
owned US subsidiary of Asahi Japan, proposed to establish a PAC to
contribute to candidates in state and local elections in Hawaii.
Although all of the directors and officers were Japanese nationals,
Kuilima stated that the PAC would be run by three US citizen
employees. Kuilima maintained that their decisions would not be
dictated or directed by Kuilima, Asahi Japan, or any of their officers
or directors. 13' Kuilima disclosed that while the PAC would not solicit
or accept funds from persons who are foreign nationals, it would
obtain most, if not all of its funding through corporate contributions
from Kuilima. Kuilima, involved in developing commercial real estate
projects that were not yet income-generating, received all its funding
from loans and contributions to capital by Asahi USA, which obtained
most of its funding from loans and contributions to capital by Asahi
Japan. The FEC ruled that because all the directors and officers of
Kuilima were foreign nationals it could not comply with previous FEC
rulings that "no director or officer of the company or its parent who
is a foreign national may participate in any way with the decision33
making process with regard to making the proposed contributions."1
The Commission further stated that "even if Kuilima were not funded
predominantly by a foreign national corporation, it still would not be
1 34
able to contribute to the proposed committee.'
The Commission subsequently allowed GEM of Hawaii, a
wholly Japanese-owned U.S. subsidiary, and its GEM-PAC to make

130

Id. at 20.

Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion No. 1989-20, reprinted in
WESTLAW, File 168485 (F.E.C.) Oct. 27, 1989.
131

132
133

Id. at 1.

Id. at 2. See FEC Advisory Commission Opinions 1985-3 and 1982-10.

13' Id. at 2.
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contributions to candidates in federal, state and local elections because
one of the company's three directors was an American, the other two
being Japanese nationals. 3 In its request for the FEC Advisory
Opinion, GEM stated that GEM derived all its revenues from
merchandise sales and other related ventures in Hawaii, and that the
GEM-PAC is controlled by US national administrators and managers.
GEM stated "Neither the Japanese directors nor any other foreign
national participates in decision-making as to where contributions
should be directed or in the administration of the committee in any
way. ' 136 The Commission distinguished the GEM case from the
Kuilima opinion because GEM received all its revenues from the
operations of its Stores in Hawaii, not from the subsidiary of a wholly
foreign owned corporation, as in Kuilima,137 and GEM is not
controlled by foreign nationals, (presumably because one of the three
directors was American' 38) whereas Kuilima's directors were all
foreign nationals. 139

135

FEC Advisory Commission Opinion 1989-29, reprinted in WESTLAW, File

225186.
136

137

Id. at 1.
But see dissenting opinion of Commissioner Scott E. Thomas. Id. at 5, n.5.

Thomas explains: "The majority distinguishes Advisory Opinion 1989-20[kuilima] by
saying that the domestic subsidiary there was 'predominantly funded by a foreign
national parent.' Advisory Opinion 1989-29 at 3. Yet, that finding was not the sole
basis for the Commission's conclusion in that [kuilima] opinion. As Advisory Opinion
1989-20 [Kuilima] points out, 'even if Kuilima were not funded predominantly by a
foreign national corporation, it still would not be able to contribute to the proposed
committee,' because of the foreign national presence on the board of directors."
138 Id. at 3. Thomas, in comparing the Kuilima decision to the GEM case, states
"There is one difference between these cases. In Kuilima, all of the directors of the
subsidiary were foreign nationals. In GEM, all of the directors of the subsidiary are
foreign nationals, save for one United States citizen who sits on the board of directors
and is also a corporate officer. Advisory Opinion 1989-29 at 1. Apparently that
makes all the difference to the majority in deciding whether foreign nationals exercise
any influence on the political committee.
FEC Advisory Opinion No. 1989-20, reprintedin WESTLAW, File 168485
(F.E.C.) 2.
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Commissioner Scott E. Thomas, in dissenting to the GEM
FEC advisory opinion rejected the treatment of a U.S. subsidiary as a
separate entity from its foreign parent company. Thomas stated:
Throughout the Act and Commission regulations, a
parent corporation and its subsidiary corporations are
viewed as one entity. We see no reason why the
Commission should treat a parent corporation and its
subsidiaries as one entity under the contribution limits
and corporate solicitation provisions, but consider
them as separate, distinct and presumably independent
entities for purposes of the §441e foreign national
provision.'40
Commissioner Thomas specifically refers to two instances
within the Act and Commission regulations where a parent
corporation and its subsidiary are viewed as one entity: for purposes
of single contribution limitations, and under the corporate solicitation
rules. First Commissioner Thomas looks to "2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(5),
which provides that 'the separate segregated funds established,
financed, maintained or controlled by the same corporation including
any parent, subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local unit of
such corporation' are automatically considered to have been made by
a single committee and subject to a single contribution limit. 2 U.S.C.
§441a(a)(5); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(2) and 10.3(a)(1)(i)."'' Then
140

See dissenting opinion of commissioner Scott E. Thomas, FEC Advisory Opinion

1989-29 at 1.
Id. at 2. Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Scott E. Thomas. Thomas, citing

141

FEC advisory opinion 1976-104, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5255,
explains the legislative intent in creating the "anti-proliferation" provision, §441
a(a)(5): "to prevent evasion of the Act's [Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971]
contribution limits by the existence of splinter political action committees (PACs)
which were ostensibly separate entities, but were in fact set up, aided, directed or
controlled in some manner by the parent organization." In fact, the broad intent of
§441a(a)(5) was explained in the House Conference Report. House Administration
Committee Chairman Hays stated: "Yet another major step to strengthen the
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Commissioner Thomas reviewed other Commission opinions which
"treat a parent corporation and its subsidiary as one entity under the
corporate solicitation rules."
While U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(A)(i)
"permits a corporation to solicit contributions for its separate
segregated fund" only "from its stockholders, executive or
administrative personnel and their families" the Commission goes even
further in viewing the corporation and its subsidiary as one entity.
Commissioner Thomas points out that "Commission regulations and
rulings.. .specifically allow a corporation to solicit the executive or
administrative personnel of the corporation's subsidiaries. 11 C.F.R.
§114.5 (g)(1)' 42 Moreover, "the Commission has ruled that a whollyowned subsidiary may solicit not only the permissible class of the
parent corporation but also the permissible class of the other
subsidiaries of the parent corporation and the permissible class of the
1 43
subsidiaries of those fellow subsidiaries."'
Commissioner Thomas concluded that "If GEM's parent
corporation were a domestic corporation, there is no doubt that the
majority would view GEM and its parent as automatically affiliated.
In so finding, the majority would view the parent corporation and its
subsidiaries as one entity when applying the contribution limits and
solicitation rules.' 144 In a subsequent case allowing a wholly foreign
owned US subsidiary to form a PAC for purposes of political
contribution limitation provisions is the one that assures that closely connected entities

cannot defeat the contribution limitations stated in the bill. To achieve this objective
the complex and amorphous control criteria embodied in the 1974 Act are replaced
by a far simpler formal relations test whose meaning is spelled out in detail in the
conference report." 122 CONG. REc. H3778 (daily ed. May 3, 1976) (statement of
Rep. Hays). See also, FEC v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific Political Fund, 828 F.2d

502, 505 (9th Cir. 1987), stating the Congressional intent of §441 a(a)(5) to be
preventing corporations and labor unions "from evading contribution limitations
through a Hydia-like proliferation of segregated funds, each making separate

contributions, but each being a part of the same beast."
142 See also FEC Advisory Opinion 1989-29, reprintedinWESTLAW, File 225186
(F.E.C.) 2, Dec. 19, 1989, dissenting opinion of Commissioner Thomas.
143 Id. at 2. See Advisory Opinion 1982-18, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH)
45664, April 23, 1982.
14 Id. at 2.
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contributions, it cited the dissent for the same reason in GEM: that"
a wholly owned domestic subsidiary and its foreign national parent
corporation should be treated as one entity. 0t4s
When the FEC ruled that "a corporation that is a subsidiary of
a Canadian corporation may make a contribution to a state campaign
'
so long as foreign money is not involved."146
Former Commissioner
Harris reiterated that "the subsidiary of a foreign corporation may not
make contributions, in connection with any elections in this
1 47

country."

While the debate over whether or not domestic subsidiaries of
foreign owned parent corporations should or should not be allowed
to form PACs and contribute to U.S. campaigns, FEC Advisory
Opinions continue to allow domestic subsidiaries to do so. The FEC
continues to make arbitrary and somewhat dubious distinctions on
what constitutes "foreign control". In 1992 the FEC allowed Nansay
Hawaii, a U.S. subsidiary of Nansay Japan, the foreign parent
corporation, to form a PAC and contribute to U.S. campaigns.
Nansay Hawaii received regular subsidies in the form of loans or
contributions of capital from its foreign national parent, half the board
145 FEC Advisory Opinion 1992-16, reprintedin WESTLAW, File 157667 at 4, Sept.

14, 1992. Dissenting Opinion of Vice Chairman Scott E. Thomas and Commissioner
Danny Lee McDonald. Vice Chairman Thomas stated:
Just as a domestic corporation and its subsidiaries are seen as one
entity (.See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(5); 2 U.S.C.
§441b(b)(4)(A)(i); II C.F.R. 114.5(g)(1).) to prevent a parent
corporation from making excessive contributions through its
subsidiaries' political committees, so too a foreign national parent
corporation and its subsidiaries should be seen as one entity to
prevent the corporation from making prohibited contributions
through its subsidiaries. As the wholly owned subsidiary of a
foreign national parent corporation, Nansay Hawaii should not be
allowed to make contributions to candidates for political offices."
Id at 4.
146 FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-3, reprintedin I Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide
(CCH) 5809 Feb. 28, 1985.
147 Id. (Harris dissenting).
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members were Japanese nationals, and the PAC would be voted into
existence by the board. However, the FEC allowed the PAC
formation on the following conditions: (1) the foreign national
members of the subsidiary's Board would abstain from voting on
matters concerning the PAC and its activities, (2) the foreign nationals
on the board also abstain from voting on the selection of individuals
to operate the PAC, (3) only non-foreign nationals participate in the
functions and operations of the committee.' 48
In the latest FEC Advisory Opinion involving a domestic
subsidiary of a foreign parent corporation, Allison Engine, was
allowed to maintain its PAC after a 100% acquisition by the United
Kingdom corporation, Rolls-Royce. Allison PAC simply adopted bylaws stating the PAC would only be controlled by U.S. nationals.
Furthermore, with certain recommended changes by the FEC to bring
the PAC within time frame requirements, the Allison PAC was
allowed to implement an "Employee Earmarking Program", or a
"Payroll Deduction Plan" where the employees of Allison Engine
could voluntarily elect to contribute to the Allison PAC in the form of
payroll deduction or personal check.' 49
In addition to making direct campaign contributions through
PACs of foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiaries, the influence of foreign
corporations can be seen in a nonelectoral context at the state and
local level. This foreign political participation takes the form of
influence on state and local officials by foreign corporations offering
to locate a U.S. subsidiary in the officials' districts, providing jobs and
industrial growth, in exchange for incentive packages.
C. ForeignCorporateIhfluence in State and Local Politics
States have implemented rewarding incentive systems to
recruit foreign investment. Most common state strategies, to maintain
148

FEC Advisory Opinion 1992-16, reprintedin WESTLAW File 157667 (FEC) at

3, June 26, 1992.
149 FEC Advisory
2, June 30, 1995.

Opinion 1995-15, reprintedin WESTLAW, File 437680 (FEC) at
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a favorable business environment, include a combination of increased
economic incentives, expanded overseas branch offices, and
advantageous public policies regarding foreign investment.5 0 This
state recruitment effort for foreign direct investment first started under
Ronald Reagan's "New Federalism".
President Reagan's
administration sharply reduced the federal government's role in
domestic industrial policy."' Now, states and cities, in large part, bear
the responsibility for their own economic development.
The major incentives states now offer foreign companies
include: tax concessions, industrial development bonds (IDBs),5 2
public-private sector agreements,' 53 and infrastructure development
and special services. " Specifically, these incentive programs include
general tax rate reduction,155 property-tax exemptions,"5 " low interest
financing,"17 and improved rail and highway connections, roads,
sewers, and water facilities. 5 The competition for foreign direct
investment has often times resulted in rigorous bidding wars where
states often advertise relaxed environmental statutes, repealed taxes
and low worker's compensation rates.'59

150 TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 49.
151 GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 225.
152 State and local governments offer these municipal bonds to finance industrial
projects at low interest rates. Typically, in an IDB, a state or municipality purchases
or builds a facility, then leases it back to the investor. Through IDBs, a company has
the advantage of having additional capital because it does not pay the substantial
property tax it would if the company were responsible for the acquisition of the
property. See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 3, at 59.
5 Public-private sector agreements occur where state sponsored cooperatives
soliciting foreign banks investigate sections of the state, analyzing them for their
investment potential. These banks than encourage corporations from their countries
to invest in the sections the banks have found to have the most potential. See TOLCHIN
& TOLCHMN, supranote 3, at 60.
154 Id. at 58-60.
155 Id. at 59.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.

159 Id. at 61.
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While states and localities compete with each other to offer the
best incentives to foreign investors, it is well documented that
ultimately, incentive programs have very little to do with a company's
decision of where to locate, and in fact are only considered in the very
last stages of negotiation.16 More important factors cited by foreign
companies in making location decisions include the cost of labor, low
level of union activity, the weather and healthy consumer markets.'
A foreign company makes their first important locational
decision when the company decides to locate in the United States.
This is the first major incentive, to avoid costly U.S. restrictive trade
barriers." The next stage in the decision of where to locate a foreign
subsidiary is to locate the region which is most appropriate for their
business. During this second stage the company looks for proximity
to suppliers and markets, wages and unionization.163 The third stage
1 4
of the location decision is to find the best location within the region. 6
This locational decision evaluates good transportation to markets,
prevailing wages of the city, worker skill and production levels, and
the quality of life, important especially to industries that necessitate
attracting engineers and scientists. 6
While the above factors are the most important factors in
deciding where a foreign subsidiary will locate, it has been shown that
short-cited incentives do nothing to influence these factors. Most
studies of location factors show that incentives are not important.166

160

Id. at 62.

161
162

Id. at 62-63.
For example, Ben C. Huang, manager of the import and traffic division of

SAMPO, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of television sets discussed the firm's decision
to locate a plant in Norcross, Georgia. Huang stated that the reason for the location
was pure and simple, it was to avoid the imposition of protective tariff. Id. at 62.
163 GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 228.
164

id.

165 Id.
166

See generally,ROGER W. SCHMENNER,

MAKING LOCATION DECISIONS 51

(1982).

See also MICHAEL KIESCHNICK, TAXES AND GROWTH: BusiNEss INCENTIVES AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1981); on foreign companies, Jeffrey Arpan, The Impact
of State Incentives on Foreignhivestors' Site Selections, 66 ECONOMIc REVIEW, 36-
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167

Foreign investors have demonstrated their political negotiating
savvy through their ability to utilize the political process of the United
States. The success of these transnational corporations in
manipulating the U.S. politicalsystem can be attributed to the divided
front of the United States economic and political processes. By
allowing the fifty states and millions of localities to develop their own
industrial development policies without Federal oversight, the United
States' national industrial development policy of default forfeits the
economic advantages of its strong and attractive markets. The
transnational investment in the United States will not cease with the
adoption of a cohesive national industrial development policy which
limits foreign access to political and economic resources. The

42 (1981); and William Wheaton, InterstateDifferences in the Level of Business
Taxation, 36 NATiONAL TAX JOURNAL 5 (1983).
167 These solutions are by no means meant to be an exhaustive list of remedies to the
problems of foreign participation in the politics of the United States. Many other
solutions have been proffered by several authors. Some such proposals include
requiring full disclosure of foreign agents by eliminating the Foreign Agent
Registration Act exemptions for: (1)Lobbyists who work for an American Affiliate
of a foreign company, (2) Lawyers who perform legal chores on their clients' behalf,
even when the same work might be considered lobbying when done by nonlawyers,
and (3) Foundations funded by foreign companies and governments but incorporated
in the United States should similarly be excluded. See Choate, supra note 2 , at 201202. It has also been recommended that Ex-Officials' ability to become foreign agents
or lobbyists should be limited by: (1) a permanent restriction on becoming a foreign
agent for a foreign interest: including PAC participation, lobbying, and advising for
the highest federal positions, (2) a longer time period before lower-level federal
officials can lobby, counsel, or advise on trade matters. This is combined with an
employment contract that prohibits the use of trade secrets in subsequent employment
opportunities. (Currently a five year waiting period, or "cooling-off' period is one year
by federal law, as of January 1991.), and (3) strengthening the federal programs by
filling key policy positions and ambassadorships with professionals, not amateur
politicians and by attracting quality talented people to public office by offering higher
salaries and discouraging government bashing. Pat Choate states that by bashing
government, public service becomes an object of contempt. See CHOATE, supra note
2, at 202.
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adoption of such a policy only helps to balance the benefits of foreign
investment with the economic and political disadvantages of foreign
access to rich U.S. resources.
U.S. foreign policy has been and continues to support and
encourage U.S. business opportunities abroad. The hypocrisy is that,
in the process, U.S. business interests are being undercut at home by
foreign influence. The United States' inability to respond to the
increasing involvement of foreign corporate participation in local,
State, and Federal political processes allows U.S. political and
economic resources to be squandered while at the same time leaving
U.S. home markets susceptible to foreign control. This policy of
default by the United States is inconsistent with the historical United
States' policy abroad that has worked so hard to promulgate national
treatment standards in an effort to allow U.S. corporations to gain
access to global markets. The U.S. home markets and U.S. political
resources need not suffer foreign influence to ensure U.S. access
abroad. In fact, the U.S. corporations do not enjoy the same levels of
access to foreign political and economic resources abroad. To balance
the interests of U.S. corporations and U.S. political interests, the
United States needs to implement a cohesive national industrial
development policy that is not one of default, but a policy of
balancing the active attraction of foreign direct investment and
safeguarding national political and economic resources.
A. ProhibitForeignParticipationin American Elections
Political action committees of foreign owned subsidiaries
influence political outcomes with financial resources in the same
manner U.S. corporations do. While these PACs are legal, they are
detrimental to the United States." 8 Despite repeated opportunities
168

According to Graham & Krugman, when foreign investors successfully influence

the American political system, the investor often gets public policies enacted which
will be largely beneficial to them, but of little importance or necessity to the general
public. Moreover, the effective "playing of the game" by a foreign investor will
redistribute income out of the country instead of redistributing it within the country.
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Congress has refused to significantly amend the Federal Campaign
Election Act of 1971 to prohibit the formation and use of foreign
owned subsidiaries' PACs. 69 The FEC has, on various occasions,
asked for clarification and made legislative recommendations to
Congress to reexamine the section 441e prohibition on contributions
by foreign nationals in connection with federal, state, and local
elections.17
The Commission has frequently made similar legislative
recommendations to Congress to examine section 441el" and to
amend the Federal Election Campaign Act. Requested amendments
would clarify the scope of foreign participation through the PACs of
American subsidiary corporations. Such clarification is necessary
because many problems have arisen concerning the FEC's
administration and enforcement of this provision.
In 1987 one of the most significant proposed amendments'72
to section 441e was defeated. The legislation would have amended
the provision prohibiting contributions in elections by foreign nationals
by adding: "including any separate segregated fund or nonparty,
1
mutlicandidate political committee of a foreign national." "
Additionally, the definition of "foreign national" would have been
broadened to include: "any partnership, association, corporation, or
subsidiary corporation organized under or created by the laws of the
United States, a State, or any other place subject to the jurisdiction of

EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAuL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DiREcr INVESTMENT INTHE
UNITED STATES 89 (Institute for International Economics 1995).
169 See generally,THOMAS M. DURBIN, ForeignParticipation in FederalElections:
A LegalAnalysis 12 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, 28 April 1987).
170 See FEC Legislative Recommendations, FEC Press Release, March 4, 1987; see
also FEC Record, V. 13, No. 4, pp. 6-7, April 1987; FEC Agenda Document No. 8722, p.31, 2/24/87.
171 2 U.S.C. Code § 441e (1972).
172 See 133 CONG. REC. § 113 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987)(summary of the Boren-Byrd
Senatorial Election Campaign Act).
173 See S. 2, 1OOTH CONG., IST SESS., §8(1) (1987), and S. 779, 100TH CONG., IST
SEss., § 10(2) (1987).
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the United States if more than 50 per1 centum
of such entity is owned
74
or controlled by a foreign principal.
These provisions would prohibit American subsidiaries of
foreign parent corporations to establish political action committees,
which can make election contributions that would otherwise be
prohibited by section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, as amended (2 U.S.C. §441e).
PACs of wholly foreign-owned United States subsidiaries have
no place in the elections of the United States. For various reasons
foreign participation has been prohibited from the national, state and
local elections of the United States. These prohibitions are articulated
in the Federal Election Campaign Act, Section 411 e.
Moreover, new legislation does not have to be enacted to treat
foreign owned subsidiaries and their foreign parent corporations as
one entity, thereby precluding them from forming PACs and
participating in the U.S. political process. The existing laws of 2
U.S.C. § 441 a(a)(5), cited to by the several reviewed dissenting FEC
advisory opinions, requires subsidiaries and their parent corporations
to be treated as one entity for the purposes of making campaign
contributions. This statute read together in the context of § 411 e,
which prohibits contributions or expenditures by foreign nationals,
would treat subsidiaries as a part of a foreign parent corporation and
preclude them, as a foreign national, from making campaign
contributions. Section 41 le explicitly states that "a foreign national
shall not direct, dictate, control, or directly participate in the decision
making process of any person, such as a corporation, .. .or political
committee with regard to such person's Federal or nonfederal electionrelated activities...".. 17 This law could be no clearer. It is now time
to redefine "foreign national", to include foreign-owned subsidiary
corporations both incorporated in the United States and having their
principal place of business in the United States.

" See also S. 2, 1OOTH

CONG., IST SESS.,

IST SESS., § 10(2) (1987).

175 11

C.F.R. § 110.4 (a)(3).

§8(2) (1987), and S. 779, 1OOTH CONG.,
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B. Implement a Cohesive andEffective NationalForeignInvestment
Programfor the United States
Foreign investment in the United States can add to the
economy. 76 However, a cohesive national policy on foreign direct
investment needs to be formulated and aggressively used. While there
is substantial debate over what kind of national policy should be
adopted most scholars agree that a national policy would be most
beneficial for the United States's economic, political, and national
security interests. For example, Glickman and Woodward propose a
sound investment policy that would include performance
requirements, clawback provisions for enforcement of the
performance requirements, and limited structured incentives, to
recapture the paid incentives in a reasonable time all coordinated into
a coherent strategy for economic development.177 However, Graham
and Krugman are proponents of a national policy that would broaden
the scopeof national treatment to new multilateral agreements that
would cover foreign direct investment.'
The Professors, Susan and
Martin Tolchin argue that the fifty separate countries that the states
act as to attract foreign investment does not create a level playing field
for states to negotiate because the resources of the foreign
corporations far olitweigh the states.'79
While all scholars do not agree on what exact policy should be
accepted, there is a consensus that the federal government of the
United States needs to address the problem of foreign influence on the
state and local politics of the United States. By evaluating the need
for a cohesive national industrial development policy, the federal
government will be forced to reexamine the conflicting goals of
pursuing national treatment abroad, for U.S. corporations investing in
host countries and the goal of maintaining national sovereignty in the
United States, by limiting foreign participation in the U.S. political
supra note 5, at 254.
Id. at 251-254.
178 GRAHAM & KR mMAN, supranote 4, at 169.
179 TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supranote 3, at 271.
176 GLICKMAN & WOODWARD,
177

1996-97] FOREIGNMONEY IN UNITED STA TES POLITICS 585
process. Of course, by exerting control on a federal level, the states
powers to offer incentives to foreign investors will necessaryily be
limited.
C. Ban State and Local Incentives to Attract ForeignCorporations
An integrated United States policy regarding industrial
development would address the problem of the currently splintered
and competing state policies seeking to attract foreign investment. In
1986 states spent over $40 million to attract foreign corporations'
direct investment. 80 The use of state and local incentives to attract
foreign corporations "dissipates any national gain from the spillovers,
transferring them to the foreign firm instead."'' Additionally, states
and localities do not implement a uniform economic investment policy.
States have long been criticized for disregarding the long term effects
of using incentive packages to attract foreign investment. For
example, lax environmental controls in return for foreign investment
may trade short-term jobs for pollution, but does not analyze the long
term effect of such environmental concessions.'
Moreover, states are simply not in a position to bargain
effectively with foreign firms making "siting" decisions. The
incentives states have to offer are limited. The revocation of state
incentive packages would serve to avoid unnecessary windfalls for the
foreign corporations while gaining the benefit of foreign investment in

180

See Marianne K. Clarke, Revitalizing State Economies: A Review of State

Economic Development Policies and Programs (Washington, D.C.: National

Governors Association, 1986).
181 According to Graham & Krugman, this dissipation of gains is a direct result of the
fact that the foreign firn has already decided to build a facility in the United States and
the firm regards a number of U.S. locations as equally suitable for the site. It is when
the candidate states and localities compete to attract the firm that tax breaks,
provisions of infrastructure, and subsidies are offered to the firm. In exchange, the
firm chooses that state or locality. This wastes U.S. resources because one place in
the U.S. would have received the benefits of the foreign facility regardless of whether
or not the incentives were given. GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 89.
182 GLICKMAN & WOODWARD, supranote 5, at 251.
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the United States economy.
Legislative reconsideration of the existing statutes is necessary
for the government agencies to effectively monitor and control the
forces of foreign direct investment and the extent of, if at all, their
participation in the political processes of the United States. The
successful elimination of foreign leverage in bargaining with state and
local officials would eliminate the micro-economic competition
between states for foreign companies' operations. The clarification
and enforcement of existing legislation would force states to comply
with a cohesive economic policy that is beneficial to the United States.

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States needs to acknowledge the modem changes
in the dynamic environment of world trade and investment. Such
economic forces are rarely stagnant, and a country's ability to
successfully evaluate and respond to the forces which operate within
international economics frequently determine that country's role and
status within the economic market place.
The United States has to evaluate the goals of its own
economic success abroad, through its access to foreign markets and
a globally integrated market place, and its goal of national sovereignty
and its political and economic security within the United States. To
address only one of the goals compromises the other. Both interests
are fundamental to the economic and political strength of the United
States. Efforts to remedy the current situation should encourage
foreign direct investment in the United States, while safeguarding
limited political and economic resources.
Finally, the United States legislation does have safeguards in
place to protect against undue foreign influence in the U.S. political
process. However, these precautions have failed and the pertinent
legislation has not been applied effectively. This legislation need only
be enforced to comply with the letter and spirit of the provisions.

